The anxiety of many state civil servants (ASN) about the gap in remuneration and incentives between ministries/institutions (K/L) “sultans” and “commoners,” which is now resurfacing, even though it has been happening for a long time, is not substantive. Likewise, the performance of state institutions, in central or regional administrations, which is felt to be sluggish, is not responsive enough to serve the public. So, what is the point? The stagnation of bureaucratic reform (RB).

Bureaucratic affairs are almost as old as the Republic. First president Sukarno started by establishing the Office of Civil Servant Affairs (KUP) in 1948, the Organizational Committee for Ministries (Panok) and the State Administration Agency (LAN) in 1957, to the Supervisory Agency for State Apparatus Activities (Bapekan) in 1959.

President Soeharto formed the State Apparatus Empowerment Ministry (PAN) to handle government employees. After the reform frenzy died down, for the first time the RB aspect was reflected in the cabinet nomenclature when president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono changed the PAN Ministry to become the PAN and RB Ministry with the aim of making it a strategic agenda. Bureaucracy was not only a personnel matter, but also a matter of public offices and institutions.

President Jokowi continued by making RB a development priority through efforts to ensure “the state is present” in Nawacita in the first period to the Five Visions in the second period.

This long history confirms that the state’s mandate is to create a bureaucracy that is empowered and has integrity. That is, human resources and public institutions that are accountable, productive, professional and free from corruption. However, perhaps the mandate is too big for us to make it happen. RB runs relatively slowly, if not idle. So, it is time to clean up. RB must be accelerated and strengthened. The focus is on people and institutions.

ASN improvement

First, reforming ASN as bureaucratic human resource (HR). Jokowi has laid the groundwork: national talent management, which also includes ASN transformation. It contains acquisition, career and competency development, and employee placement (Permen PAN and RB No 3/2020). This policy must be implemented quickly. Maybe the government already has a plan. However, what is the national strategy? What is the roadmap like? How is the governance of its implementation? They are not communicated properly to our 4.3 million civil servants, namely 3.95 million civil servants (PNS) and 359,000 government employees with work contracts (PPPK).

As a result, most civil servants do not know how to transform themselves. True, ASN recruitment has been fairer and more transparent with digital technology, but the issue of meeting the needs (formation) and quality standards is still a big problem.

Most civil servants do not know how to transform themselves.

Career development and training schemes for ASN are also available. However, there are complaints regarding the curriculum and training process that are not in line with the demands of the times. Placements according to the needs have been attempted, but not all have been fulfilled, let alone match the expertise. Mobility for enrichment and career advancement is low due to the incompatibility of salaries, and the incentives and ranks between ministries/institutions.

It is no secret that the nation’s best talents do not work for the country. Most of them choose the business world or become entrepreneurs. Those who want to work for the state will first choose the “top-tier,” “sultan,” or Tier 1 ministries/institutions, such as the Finance Ministry, the Supreme Court, or the State Audit Body (BPK); not Tier 3, let alone Tier 4, such as the Social Affairs Ministry, Manpower, the KPU, or the majority of other ministries/institutions. The reason is simple but fundamental: income and rewards.

There is a misconception that working in the private sector is for the purpose of making money, and working for the state is service. This must be clarified. Working is indeed to earn income in the business world and for the country. That is the essence of work. An inability or unwillingness to reward work through a decent income will result in an inability to attract quality talent. This expression sounds painful, but true: “you pay peanuts, you get monkeys.”

So, do not be surprised, there are more stories, or news, about the state apparatus accumulating wealth. Some were hidden in secret until they were found out, and some officially held double positions as commissioners or supervisory boards in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

It has been common practice for years. So when the wealth was revealed of former internal affairs police chief Insp. Gen. Ferdy Sambo; echelon III employee of the Directorate General of Taxation, Rafael Alun Trisambodo; head of Customs and Excise Makassar Andhi Pramono; or head of the East Jakarta BPN Office Sudarman Harjasaputra, with tens, even hundreds of billions of rupiah in assets, the opinion that the wrongdoing was committed by individuals (and not systemic) is increasingly irrelevant. Sri Mulyani’s statement that 69 civil servants at the Finance Ministry were involved in dubious transactions and had extraordinary assets emphasizes the extent of this phenomenon.

The fact that there were those who were found out, does not mean that others did not do it. Deputy chairperson of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) emphasized that many officials have suspicious wealth, but this has not been disclosed to the public. Therefore, the first key to ASN talent management is the willingness to respect bureaucratic human resources fairly and adequately. ASN salaries may not be lower than private employee salaries for equivalent qualifications.

So, it is not only the single salary system, but also the single and decent salary system within the government that must be the target of improvement. A decent salary allows the state to recruit superior talents, while a single salary encourages the optimization of career development, performance and ASN placement. Both enable ASN talent management to be more open, fair, transparent and based on merit.

The key is governance, which is essentially a separation of powers between those who make policies, who implement them (including mobilizing resources), and evaluate (Op-ed Kompas, 15/2/2023). It is time for the President to intervene himself. The triumvirate that handles ASN, the PAN and RB Ministry, the LAN, and the State Civil Service Agency (BKN), must overhaul its governance as the executor of ASN talent management.

This ASN reform is absolute so that bureaucratic human resources are worthy of taking responsibility for realizing the future of the country.

The method? One: The formation must be coordinated. The needs of ministries/agencies are consolidated as a national recruitment strategy. Two: The selection must be carried out with criteria and testing tools that are compatible across ministries/institutions and over time. There are still ministries/institutions using their own test instruments, which are claimed to be superior but are actually out of date and fail to capture potential candidates.

Three: Apply a single and proper payroll system so that not only will there be no more “castes” between ministries/institutions, but also to build the healthy motivation of the apparatus. Four: Training and career development with a syllabus and curriculum that is in line with the challenges and progress of the times. ASN must also be facilitated in taking further education so that they are exposed to intellectual traditions to understand evidence-based policies.

Five: The assignment and placement according to the needs of the country. An integrated ASN database must be developed to map officers with the specific skills and experience needed by the state.

Finally, a code of ethics to build ASN integrity. Double job/income must be prohibited, conflicts of interest are prohibited, assets are reported, and corruption is not forgiven. The attitude and way of thinking of serving, and not giving a hard time to the public, must be built as the essence of the ASN mental revolution.

This ASN reform is absolute so that bureaucratic human resources are worthy of taking responsibility for realizing the future of the country.

Institutional reform

Reforming public institutional arrangements. Among the various problems of institutional governance, the author proposes three priority areas for improvement. First, the integration of planning and budgeting. Since the collapse of the New Order, the unity of planning and budgeting has also collapsed. The two are separate regimes that operate independently. Planning is handled by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) and budgeting by the Budget Directorate General at the Finance Ministry. As a result, planning is often not in line with budgeting.

The victims are the work programs of the government itself. Because of this, the integration of the Krisna and Sakti applications as mandated by PP No 17/2017 concerning the synchronization of planning and budgeting needs to be appreciated. Yet, that is not enough. You must have the courage to envision that planning and budgeting are also institutionally integrated.

The Budget Directorate General is united with Bappenas, as is the Office of Management and Budget in the US or the Treasury in the United Kingdom, which are directly under the president or prime minister. We can learn from developed countries, not the institutions, on the integration of planning and budgeting.

Second, reforming institutional governance that mobilizes state financial resources has recently been under scrutiny by the public. Based on the principle of separation of power-authority-responsibility, the following arrangement is proposed: The Customs and Excise Directorate General should be separated from the Finance Ministry and united in a new institution that handles state revenues directly under the President. It is like Revenue and Customs in England or the Australian Taxation Office in Australia. The Budget Directorate General should be united with Bappenas. Other echelon I units should remain at the Finance Ministry as controllers of state fiscal and financial policies. The BPK and the Development Finance Comptroller (BPKP) should unite in a new institution such as the state inspectorate, directly under the President. It is like the National Audit Office in the UK and Australia or the Government Accountability Office in the US.

This governance reform ensures that those who bring in, spend and supervise the use of money are not integrated and are directly responsible to the President. This reform must also be accompanied by the strengthening of the KPK and the mainstreaming of prevention and prosecution of corruption.

Third, the integration of central and regional development and financial policies. It is no secret that local administrations, provinces and regencies/cities design their own development and financial policies that are often not aligned with central development and financial policies. Although this is part of the consequences of decentralization after the 1998 reforms, alignment is still necessary to ensure that national priorities are implemented at the regional level and regional needs receive adequate resource allocation.

This country will never be developed, respected or taken into account if the quality and performance of its bureaucracy remains as it is today.

Concretely planning, budgeting, execution and supervision of regional development are carried out jointly between the center and the regions. Particularly for national priority sectors. This will prevent regional heads from becoming “little kings,” and on the contrary encourage the improvement of the quality of public services in the regions.

This country will never be developed, respected or taken into account if the quality and performance of its bureaucracy remains as it is today. Public scrutiny and criticism of the bureaucracy must be the momentum to improve. The bureaucracy, with all its behavior, is the face of the state. RB is necessary because the quality of bureaucracy determines the level of the citizens’ trust in the government.