The Collapse of Government Civility

Ambruknya Keadaban Pemerintahan

The Collapse of Government Civility

Author:

This article was first published in Kompas on 7 Oktober 2025 and has been translated using AI.

 

Ambruknya Keadaban Pemerintahan

Our current way of governance may resemble the critique of the poet Juvenal from the first century AD Roman era: “panem et circenses” (bread and circuses).

If one were to summarize, perhaps the fundamental issue faced by this nation is the collapse of our state civility. Various events over the past year have clearly demonstrated this symptom.

The government’s response to the mass poisoning case in the national priority program for free nutritious food (MBG) is the most blatant example. This ranges from public officials who take the matter lightly, the absence of transparency from the National Nutrition Agency in opening the business processes for auditing, to the revelation that many kitchens providing MBG are affiliated with, or even owned by, members of the DPR, party elites, and even foundations owned by the military and police. In short, the good intentions of MBG have collapsed due to the government’s own inability to implement it.

But it is not only MBG. Other development programs are similar. The People’s School, which is implemented without the readiness of teachers, facilities, and students; the Red and White Cooperative, which contradicts cooperative principles and is prone to being controlled by elites; and the Free Health Check, which only stops at examinations without guarantees for treatment. There are many more. All of them follow a similar pattern: launched on a large scale, but the execution is forced, with minimal preparedness, accountability, and transparency.

All of this, coupled with soaring prices of basic necessities, layoffs, and the burden of living, not to mention the inappropriate behavior of officials who are even granted additional incentives, has opened eyes to the disparities and torn at the sense of justice. Ultimately, it triggered public outrage almost simultaneously in at least 173 cities/regencies, some of which ended in violence at the end of August 2025. However, even in response to this, the government’s reaction was not much different, and in fact, worse: the authorities became instruments of fear mobilization for the sake of stability, while activists were labeled as troublemakers and forcibly arrested in various cities without legal protection.

Thus, what is now evident is that the government is negligent in governance and development, yet corrections seem to be prohibited. Criticism is regarded as an attack on policy, journalists have their access revoked and are forbidden from reporting under the pretext of vulnerability. Furthermore, citizens are not allowed to report irregularities to avoid being deemed disturbing.

What really happened?

 

Patchwork authoritarian

On the one hand, it’s undeniable that the nature of government is becoming increasingly centralized, even militaristic. Some call it democratic authoritarianism or authoritarian resilience. The bottom line: democratic institutions do exist, but they are merely procedural lip service lacking substance (Nathan, 2003; Levitsky and Way, 2010). The public is not involved in policy-making, let alone correcting it; public criticism is considered anti-government and is repressed, both openly and covertly.

On the other hand, the way the government conducts development is indeed problematic, from planning, implementation, to communication. Various priority programs, due to political symbolism, are executed hastily without a well-thought-out plan, even lacking adequate regulatory frameworks. What matters is to proceed as quickly as possible, with the impacts to be considered later.

As a result? The development pattern is fragile and full of contradictions. The MBG, which should be a breakthrough in improving nutrition, still lacks a legal basis and often triggers mass poisoning due to poor management and conflicts of interest among providers. The ongoing delays in the transfer of Civil Servants (ASN) to the IKN demonstrate that political promises are prioritized while the readiness of infrastructure and institutions is neglected. The rapid revision of the State-Owned Enterprises Law just seven months after its enactment indicates that regulations can be altered according to political will, rather than for the sake of legal certainty and public interest. Furthermore, the expansion of social assistance, which should serve as an empowerment instrument, often becomes a temporary political tool, creating new dependencies among the community without strengthening their economic resilience.

Meanwhile, many public officials are apparently unprofessional—if not incompetent—in carrying out development. It is no secret that the open selection of echelon I officials is no longer conducted based on the principle of meritocracy, but rather through direct appointments. They may indeed be appointed for political reasons, such as support from certain groups. However, entrusting the course of development, which requires skilled technocracy, to those who do not understand the technical complexities is a ‘suicidal’ step in governance. This is exacerbated by extremely poor policy communication, both in conveying the logic of programs and in explaining the issues arising from those programs. There are already many examples of this.

As a result, development has deteriorated into a political project, while structural issues—governance, bureaucratic capacity, and the quality of leadership—are left unaddressed. Patchwork solutions occur here and there. The government is busy responding to short-term upheavals without establishing a long-term foundation. And when these patchwork solutions fail to resolve the issues, criticism is repressed as a solution.

 

The politics of “bread and circuses”

Our current state of government is perhaps reminiscent of the critique of the Roman poet Juvenal of the first century AD: bread and circuses (panem et circenses). He criticized the Roman people who were willing to give up their political rights in exchange for free bread (panem) and circus entertainment in the arena (circenses). It’s similar to our state of government today: people are simply given cash assistance, food subsidies, free meals, and symbolic spectacles, while the root of the problem—from bureaucratic governance to legal certainty—is left to fester. The law is transformed into a political instrument, the bureaucracy is hijacked by the regime’s interests, while the public is alienated from its role as critical citizens.

Politics, which should be shaping the nation’s collective vision, has become a battleground for oligarchic and dynastic power struggles. Hadiz and Robison (2004) call this oligarchy in the age of markets: political power is no longer based on public legitimacy, but on wealth and family networks. In Indonesia, the evidence is clear: more than 659 regional head and deputy regional head candidates in the 2024 regional elections are dynastic candidates (Kenawas and Savirani, 2025), while in the 2024 parliament, between 14 and 23.8 percent of DPR members have family ties to the political elite (Perludem, 2024; CSIS, 2024).

The economy, as a foundation for welfare, is fragile due to inconsistent policies, reliance on debt, and a lack of courage to implement structural reforms. A breakthrough of 17 economic policies worth Rp 16.23 trillion has been launched to stimulate growth and absorb labor, but its implementation faces serious challenges: governance, conflicts of interest, and environmental risks. It will only succeed if executed gradually, with clear performance indicators, transparency, and regulatory harmonization to avoid becoming a showcase project. Similarly, the injection of Rp 200 trillion into the national economy will not be effective without fiscal discipline to ensure development for all. Remember: an exclusive economy will only produce fragile growth and widen inequality.

Meanwhile, the law, which should be a guardian of certainty and an instrument of justice, has instead become a tool to justify power. Selective enforcement, blunt at the top but sharp at the bottom, has lost its dignity as a key pillar of the rule of law. Indonesia’s Rule of Law Index ranks 68th out of 142 countries, with a score of only 0.53—a decrease compared to 2022 (World Justice Project, 2024). This is evidence of the weakness of the rule of law and the lack of independence of judicial institutions.

The combination of dynastic politics, a fragile economy, and lopsided legal systems is deepening the crisis of trust. The weakening rupiah, the flight of foreign capital, and the soaring price of gold are just symptoms of the market’s plummeting confidence. The revisions to the TNI and BUMN laws, and the planned revisions to other laws that are almost certain to pass—such as the P2SK (Financial System Development and Strengthening) Law, which compromises the independence of BI, the State Treasury, and ASN—are shattering trust in regulations that are being used as political tools.

Thus, when the consolidation of democracy and the course of development are threatened by politics, economics, and law that operate independently without strong governance, citizens are instead lulled by ‘bread and circuses’. This is a serious signal of the collapse of our government’s civility, which urgently needs to be addressed.

 

Principles and solutions

Improving the way a nation is run is certainly not easy, but there are principles. First, legal certainty. The law must not be used as a tool for short-term political interests. Institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and the Supreme Court (MA) must have their independence strengthened to prevent them from succumbing to political pressure. Development governance requires the rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Unfortunately, since the KPK was weakened through the 2019 revision of the Corruption Eradication Law, these institutions, once symbols of independence, are now vulnerable to political intervention. If Indonesia wants to restore public and market trust, legal reforms that uphold the independence of the judiciary and oversight institutions are a necessity, not an option. Parallel to this, political reforms must be implemented, starting with transparent party funding to prevent dynasties and oligarchies from dominating it. This is an absolute requirement to prevent state capture and ensure fairness in political competition. Anti-dynasty regulations are also urgent because dynastic politics are becoming increasingly prevalent.

Second, transparency and accountability. People have the right to know what their taxes are used for, how public contracts are made, and how policies are made. Transparency creates social accountability, reduces opportunities for corruption, and increases public trust. The OECD (2017) shows that budget transparency increases the effectiveness of fiscal policy and government legitimacy. The practice of government transparency in more than 70 countries through the Open Government Partnership (OGP) shows that public access to data on contracts, public spending, and procurement of goods and services can reduce misappropriation. Brazil’s budget transparency portal (Portal da TransparÊncia) is often cited as an example of how transparency provides space for civil society to monitor the government. Indonesia should move beyond mere discourse on transparency to consistent accountability.

Thirdly, competence, not privilege. Meritocracy is the key to filling public positions. Public officials must be selected based on capacity, integrity, and experience, not on familial ties, political loyalty, or financial power. A stable democracy is supported by institutions that recruit state officials competitively and based on competence (Lijphart, 1999). Conversely, when public positions are inherited through dynasties or money politics, the state becomes trapped in patrimonialism, which undermines the quality of policies. Therefore, bureaucratic reform must uphold meritocracy and prevent the politicization of civil servants and public officials—political compromises must not prevail.

Fourth, the long-term development vision must be institutionalized, not merely a promise. The state needs a consistent strategic plan that transcends the five-year political horizon. This is important as a ‘rule of the game’ to ensure that the direction of development does not change with each regime change. Countries that successfully maintain a consistent vision—such as Singapore with its 50-year Concept Plan and 10-year Master Plan, or China with its Five-Year Plans modernization framework—have proven to advance in the long term. Indonesia has the RPJPN 2025–2045, but without institutional strengthening, this vision will only become political rhetoric.

Finally, public orientation. Policy is a public good, not a tool for elite enrichment. Public policy oriented towards the public interest generates social legitimacy, distributive justice, and strengthens democracy, not just economic growth. Democracy will only be healthy if civil society, the media, academics, and professional communities are actively involved, as civic engagement and social capital are key to democratization. Political literacy must be improved so that citizens can demand accountability, the media can freely monitor power, and academics can provide knowledge to strengthen public discourse. Indonesia must boldly reaffirm the orientation of public policy: sovereignty belongs to the people, not the political elite or oligarchy.

Without these principles and reforms, our already crumbling civilized way of governing will deteriorate further. We will continue to be trapped in the politics of panem et circenses—instant economics, populist entertainment, and transactional law.

 

Finally

The essence of a nation is to build the bonum commune (common good). The state is not a stage for the display of power, a machine for the distribution of privileges, or an instrument of short-term stability. The state is a collective tool for ensuring justice, prosperity, and the sustainability of national life.

For this reason, legal certainty, political transparency, fair economics, and competent bureaucracy must be key agendas in development, rather than rent-seeking projects. Only in this way can the civility of this nation be improved.

The Collapse of Government Civility

Share this post

AUTHOR

Yanuar Nugroho

Dosen STF Driyarkara, Visiting Senior Fellow ISEAS Singapura, Penasihat Centre for Innovation Policy & Governance (CIPG)

Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance (CIPG) is a research-based advisory group which aspires to excel in the area of innovation, policy and governance.

Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance (CIPG) is a research-based advisory group which aspires to excel in the area of innovation, policy and governance.

office@cipg.or.id​

'Starting from March 2024, CIPG is implementing Work From Home'

© Copyright 2025. Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance (CIPG).​

© Copyright 2020. Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance (CIPG).​

Scroll to top