This article was first published in Kompas on 7 February 2025. This article has been translated using AI.
Illustration: HERYUNANTO
One hundred days have passed since Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka were inaugurated as president and vice president in this country.
Since then, they have been running the government, trying to fulfill their political promise: Astacita. Although it is still early to judge the results, it is important to think about where they will take this res publica called Indonesia.
A 100-day period is too short to measure the success of a policy. In addition, focusing on quick wins can trap the government into rushing and becoming “populist”. In fact, not all policies launched in the first 100 days will immediately show real impact.
The Prabowo administration began with a promise to continue the policies of Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Specifically, infrastructure such as the Nusantara Capital City (IKN), downstreaming, and social protection. Additionally, free lunches (now Free Nutritious Meals/MBG), creating agricultural land, free health check-ups, establishing excellent schools, and raising the salaries of civil servants and the military/police—as listed in the best quick result programs (PHCT).
Perhaps because of that, when the public was asked about his performance, the majority felt satisfied (Kompas, 1/20/25). Although not a few thought otherwise—especially those with access to information (Celios, 1/21/25). The crux of the matter is not about satisfaction figures, but rather governance.
Governance without governance
The issue of governance is the biggest problem in these 100 days. Prabowo’s promise to “continue” Jokowi’s policies raises questions: will he also inherit the problems left behind?
Jokowi indeed prioritizes the economy, but he weakens democratic institutions, neglects the environment, and centralizes power. Therefore, the promise of “sustainability” brings concerns: Prabowo’s militaristic stance combined with Jokowi’s technocratic populism will result in stability without accountability, governance without order.
First, regarding development priorities. Prabowo emphasized: the 8 percent growth target is the cabinet’s target. All development programs must be directed towards that goal. Economic stabilization becomes the foundation. Food and fuel prices are maintained, social assistance is expanded, and MBG has started to be implemented even though it is still in the trial phase.
This is primarily to address the key issue: the widening gap, despite the reduction in poverty (BPS, 2024). Although welfare programs are becoming more targeted, regional disparities remain a challenge, alongside the middle class becoming increasingly vulnerable to falling into poverty.
Therefore, Prabowo’s development policy must be more inclusive. For example, the top-down implementation of MBG has so far drawn criticism for its lack of public involvement and almost no transparency. Not only is the nutritional content questionable, but also its governance: budget, menu determination, procurement of tools and materials, preparation process, to distribution and determination of recipient school locations.
There has never been clear communication regarding MBG policy on whether the school committee is involved, parents are invited to discuss, students are asked for input, or MSMEs and small shops around the school are listened to for their opinions.
Second, the issue of the sustainability of priority programs, especially from a fiscal perspective. For example, the estimated budget for MBG is Rp 100 trillion-Rp 150 trillion per year (Rp 71 trillion for 2025), while the total budget for six social assistance programs increases from Rp 496.8 trillion (2024) to Rp 504.7 trillion (2025). This raises concerns that other programs will be disrupted, and it seems likely.
Presidential Instruction No. 1/2025 stipulates budget efficiency (cuts) of Rp 306.69 trillion: Rp 256.1 trillion from ministries/agencies and Rp 50.59 trillion from regional transfers.
The intention of this cut is efficiency, but that is not how the public reads it. The attachment to the Minister of Finance’s Letter No. S-37/MK.02/2025 regarding this cut—despite its legality being denied (Antaranews, 1/31/25)—raised many questions.
While the budget of the majority (83) ministries/agencies was cut by 20-75 percent, a small number (17) other ministries/agencies were exempted. Among others: the National Nutrition Agency, police, prosecutors, Ministry of Defense, State Intelligence Agency, BPKP, MPR, and DPR.
Suspicion is spreading: priority implementers and security are favored, others are messed up. The problem is not only jealousy, but also the technocratic impact that is not thought through properly. The quality of public services is anticipated to be disrupted because in a number of K/L the cuts do not allow them to work.
For example, the Ministry of Public Works, whose budget was cut by Rp81.38 trillion, may no longer be able to maintain roads and bridges that are crucial for underdeveloped regions. Or the State Civil Service Agency, with a budget of Rp513 billion, will have difficulty handling civil service matters throughout Indonesia.
The first hundred days are not enough to assess Prabowo’s work results, but they can provide an overview of his priorities, governance style and policy direction.
Whatever the reason, these cuts show a lack of clear fiscal consolidation. Seven of the eight PHCT Astacita (MBG, agricultural land, social assistance, village infrastructure, free health checks, superior schools, and ASN/TNI/Polri salary increases) are spending.
Without structural tax reform or cuts to inefficient subsidies (e.g. energy), all priority programs are fiscal burdens and pose significant budget risks going forward. Populist policies, while politically expedient, should not come at the expense of long-term fiscal health.
Third, it is suspected that the cabinet’s performance is bad because there are more ministers from transactions than those who are truly experts. They do not dare to take the initiative, are weak in implementing work programs, and even without ethics abuse their positions.
Celios (2025) listed it: The Minister of Human Rights’ policies are stagnant, not acting decisively but controversial; The Minister of Cooperatives has no direction in developing cooperatives and reforming MSME support.
The Minister of Forestry failed to manage conservation but instead wanted to clear 20 million hectares of forest for the sake of the economy and ignored the environment; the Minister of Villages and Disadvantaged Regions who had no strategy for developing rural areas and abused his position for personal gain – and many more.
Finally, the poor performance of the ministers caused the cabinet to slump as criticized by Prabowo himself: overlapping regulations, slow decision-making, mismatched budgets and priorities, and weak supervision (Kompas, 10/23/2024).
This hampers the implementation of policies, reduces the effectiveness of development, and even the government looks amateurish: MBG is just going ahead, downstreaming is not supervised, land clearing for food and energy is planned haphazardly, the implementation of Value Added Tax seems wishy-washy, budget cuts are haphazard, environmental policies and energy sector reforms are actually going the other way.
There are many others. All of these need urgent improvement. What is visible may be the inertia of the bureaucracy, but do not be too quick to demonize it. The performance of the bureaucracy is very dependent on, or influenced by, the quality of its leaders.
In addition, there are also enabling factors such as regulations, institutional arrangements and accountability mechanisms. How does the bureaucracy work under a political leader in a bloated cabinet structure, slow to move because it has just been reshuffled and has no budget support and unclear performance accountability?
So perhaps there are only two causes: weak coordination – if not incompetence – of ministers who ignore accountability, which causes the collapse of governance.
So what?
Addressing these accountability and governance challenges is crucial for Prabowo to maintain public trust, ensure his agenda is implemented, and maintain political support from the coalition and face opposition criticism. Therefore, the four issues above must be seriously addressed.
First, evaluate development priorities. Prabowo’s desire for the economy to grow by 8 percent is clearly not supported by his other policies. Economic growth is influenced by the level of public consumption, government spending, investment, exports, and imports.
The ambiguity of tax policies makes people refrain from consuming; poor governance and low accountability make government spending inefficient; stagnant legal and bureaucratic reforms make investors reluctant to come, exports still rely on commodities because downstreaming is limited, while imports are actually projected to increase even though the pretext is for priority programs.
Priority evaluation is necessary for the economy to grow, perhaps not immediately high, but more inclusive, stable, sustainable.
Second, increasing fiscal capacity and overall government capacity. Budget management is important, but selective—if not reckless—cuts send a message of indifference to the government apparatus.
This budget efficiency is not unnecessary, but it must be rational so that government performance is not sacrificed. It is necessary to think about increasing the government’s ability to anticipate and shape the future (foresight) which is full of uncertainty. Just look at Trump’s victory in the US and its impact on the world including us. Has it been anticipated?
Third, what can be done, ministers and heads of institutions that are not performing should be replaced. They are the spearhead of government and the President’s right hand. Maybe initially they were appointed because of political favors when they got votes. But if those appointed are indeed incapable, they will actually be disruptive. So, as he promised, Prabowo must evaluate their performance and act immediately so that his cabinet is more capable, professional, and united.
Finally, coordination of development control. One of the root problems of the current development complexity is control. There are seven ministries/agencies with control duties: the Presidential Staff Office, the Development Control and Special Investigation Agency, Bappenas, the Cabinet Secretariat, the Coordinating Ministry, the BPKP, and the KPK. But the division of authority is unclear: which ministries/agencies control which programs, how to do it, and how to measure it.
Without control coordination to synchronize development targets and priorities, the dream of becoming a developed country is impossible to realize.
Apart from these four ideas, there are still concerns regarding the attitude of Prabowo and his government in facing demands for democratization and the narrowing of civil space.
Repressive handling of citizens’ expression of opinion (via social media, demonstrations, art exhibitions, etc.) must be stopped. Because this does not show a strong and authoritative state, but rather proof that it is weak and powerless to enforce the law and protect its citizens.
The first hundred days are not enough to judge Prabowo’s work results, but they can provide an overview of his priorities, governance style, and policy direction. Weak governance, poor coordination, and ineffective policy implementation make this government appear to easily simplify problems.
In fact, “simplifying” complex matters, such as development policies, is definitely wrong. Fundamental improvements are needed after these 100 days. We need a government that is capable and understands the substance, run by those who are professional, not transactional.
