Civil supremacy is the last bastion in keeping the state on the side of its people, not armed forces.
In August 28, 2025, the situation around the Indonesian House of Representatives heated up after a Brimob tactical vehicle ran over Affan Kurniawan in the Pejompongan area amid panic. The escalation followed with tear gas, Molotov cocktail throws, and widespread riots. Soon, seven police personnel were examined. However, public trust in the authorities and the state had already plummeted.
In response to this, the Chairperson of the House of Representatives, Puan Maharani, stated her readiness to accommodate aspirations, but without any concrete actions. President Prabowo Subianto expressed concern and called for an investigation, yet failed to provide a moral acknowledgment in the form of an apology—an act that has only fueled public protests.
International and national media also highlighted this, and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) emphasized the use of excessive force and urged an independent investigation (Kompas, 29/8/2025).
Like a fire doused with gasoline, within 48 hours, public protests turned into widespread riots that claimed victims.
At least three civil servants (ASN) were killed when the South Sulawesi Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) building in Makassar was set on fire by a mob on August 30, and several others were injured. Meanwhile, clashes were reported in Bandung, Surabaya, Bali, Solo, and other cities (Kompas, August 31, 2025).
The wave of mob violence also targeted the homes of officials and politicians. The homes of Ahmad Sahroni and Uya Kuya were looted and damaged; the homes of Eko Patrio and Nafa Urbach were raided. Even the home of Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati was looted (Kompas, August 31, 2025).
President Prabowo also reacted: ordering TNI Commander Agus Subiyanto and the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri) Listyo Sigit Prabowo to take firm action against anarchistic actions and this was confirmed by the Chief of Police himself after an evaluation meeting with President Prabowo (Kompas, 31/8/2025).
Previously, the media reported that the TNI had been deployed at several points in Jakarta, including around the DPR Building and the Mobile Brigade Command Headquarters (Mako Brimob), to assist with security (Kompas, 29/8/2025).
Serious concerns have emerged: the danger of eroding civil supremacy if the state opts for a coercive approach rather than accountability. In fact, civil supremacy is a fundamental principle of democracy. If it is eroded, the risk of normalizing military intervention in the lives of citizens becomes apparent.
This is a serious matter that must be considered carefully so that the crisis is not used as an excuse to abandon democracy.
Problem Layer
The riots occurring in several cities in Indonesia these days indeed reveal layers of issues: disputes over poverty data that are deemed manipulative, the increase in land taxes that burden the lower class, and the public perception that political elites enjoy excessive privileges amid widespread economic difficulties.
Affan’s death became the trigger for an explosion of anger over all of this, leading to widespread collective action.
In Social Movement (2004), Tilly says that mass protests are a channel for expressing accumulated structural disappointments.
Meanwhile, Gurr emphasized that the root of protests based on dissatisfaction (grievance-based mobilization) is the gap between citizens’ expectations and the state’s capacity to fulfill them (Why Men Rebel, 1970).
Therefore, what we are witnessing is not a spontaneous response to a single policy, but an eruption of feelings of injustice. It expresses the anxiety: the state’s weak ability to fulfill its mandate.
However, the most crucial dimension of this crisis lies in the erosion of public trust. Citizens see the state as being absent from protecting them, instead becoming a source of threat through violence by the authorities. Affan’s death is not a personal tragedy, but rather a symbol of the loss of assurances of safety for citizens from the institutions that should protect them.
If this condition is allowed to continue, it will erode political legitimacy and weaken social cohesion—similar to what Putnam (Bowling Alone, 2000) described about the importance of social capital and trust as the glue of democracy.
When trust breaks down, citizens will seek non-democratic ways to express their dissatisfaction.
Even more dangerous in this situation is the potential for a re-normalization of the military’s role in the civilian sphere. Social instability and the collapse of public trust could justify expanding the TNI’s mandate beyond defense, under the guise of stability.
This threatens the principle of civil supremacy which was the cornerstone of the 1998 Reformation.
Our history is replete with examples of how political crises have served as a justification for perpetuating military dominance in civilian life, from the Old Order to the New Order.
This is called authoritarian resilience (Diamond, 2002) where authoritarian regimes can survive with a democratic facade: institutions remain, elections continue to run, but the substance collapses as civilian supremacy is eroded by armed power.
This is the real danger before our eyes: a procedural democracy that is empty of meaning, while the logic of coercion once again dominates.
Therefore, we must urge that the government’s response is not coercive. A solution is only possible through accountability: an independent investigation into the deaths of citizens, acknowledgment of the mistakes made by the authorities, and a channel for honest dialogue with civil society, labor unions, and students.
In this way, the state can extinguish the flames of protest while simultaneously rebuilding the fractured foundations of trust. Without restoring trust, the crisis will shift from mere demonstrations to the undermining of democracy—and open the door to a return to militarization of the public sphere.
Three scenarios
So, where might this crisis go? Of the many possible scenarios, three are plausible.
First, the best scenario: the restoration of public trust and the maintenance of civil supremacy. The condition is that the government acts swiftly to open an independent investigation, impose sanctions on the authorities, and review the allowances of the DPR, which have become a symbol of privilege.
Channels of dialogue are being opened with students, workers, and civil society. Trust will be restored as the state demonstrates accountability. Civilian supremacy is maintained, while the military remains in its barracks. Therefore, an independent investigative team must be formed immediately, an official acknowledgement of wrongdoing must be issued, and concrete steps must be taken to correct the policy.
The second scenario is worse: a prolonged crisis, with civil supremacy beginning to erode. This will occur if the government opts for a middle path: rhetoric without real action, internal investigations without independent mandates, and handling of actions that remains repressive, albeit sporadically.
Protests will continue, casualties will mount, and trust will be further eroded. The military will begin to intervene as “security assistance,” even though it remains formally under civilian control.
We must be vigilant if there are delays in the investigation reports, a lack of sanctions against the authorities, and the emergence of military operations on the ground—because this indicates that this scenario is currently unfolding.
The worst-case scenario is when a crisis erupts and civil supremacy is utterly shattered. This is when the state resorts to absolute coercive measures: structural military involvement in crowd control, the use of live ammunition, mass arrests, and even total restrictions on media and the internet. Public trust collapses, civil space is constricted, and democracy becomes merely a facade. Civil supremacy disappears, replaced by military control in the public sphere.
What are the signs that this scenario is becoming a reality? The declaration of a military emergency, the issuance of a government regulation in lieu of law (perppu) on “national security” that expands the mandate of the authorities, and the massive placement of active officers in civil positions.
Which is most likely to happen?
All three are possible and plausible. However, the decisive factor lies in the government’s choice of response: accountability or coercion. If the government chooses the path of accountability—independent investigations, admissions of wrongdoing, revisions to flawed policies—then there is a chance to restore trust.
In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986), O’Donnell and Schmitter warn: democratic legitimacy can only be maintained if the state is able to respond to societal demands without reverting to the logic of repression. Conversely, if the state allows the crisis to drag on, public trust will continue to erode.
According to Putnam (2000), the loss of social trust weakens society’s collective capacity to maintain democracy. In the Indonesian context, the collapse of trust means society is vulnerable to polarization, horizontal conflict, or even the pursuit of non-democratic political channels.
The greatest risk is if this crisis is used as a pretext to normalize the military’s role in the civilian sphere. Levitsky and Way (2010) in “Competitive Authoritarianism” assert that democracy can survive formally, but its content and practice are emptied through coercive institutional control. Indonesia has experienced this: the militarization of civilian space in the name of stability during the New Order era.
If this pattern repeats itself, what will emerge is not a resilient democracy, but rather authoritarian resilience (Diamond, 2002).
Thus, the government’s choices today will determine the course of history: whether Indonesia advances toward a more mature democracy through the restoration of trust, or regresses toward a procedural democracy without substance, as civilian supremacy is eroded by military control.
Step calculation
So, to be loyal to the 1998 reforms, what must be done?
First, the President must take a leading role in a transparent and accountable manner. One, by issuing an apology and ordering an independent investigation—into the deaths of civilians and the excessive use of violence—involving the National Commission on Human Rights, the Ombudsman, and academics.
Second, a public acknowledgement that the state is responsible for protecting its citizens, not harming them. Symbolic acts such as the President’s visit to the victims’ families can restore some trust.
Third, correcting the policies that triggered the incident, particularly regarding DPR allowances and unequal austerity policies. This aligns with Dahl’s (1971) notion of responsiveness as the core of democracy: the state responds to citizens’ aspirations with concrete actions, not just rhetoric.
Second, the leaders of the armed forces—the TNI and Polri—must reaffirm the limits of their constitutional mandate: to maintain defense and security, not to regulate civilian life.
The TNI must ensure that soldiers are not deployed to control civil protests, except in official emergency situations, in accordance with the law. The Polri must ensure that its presence is to protect the citizens, not to intimidate them.
Public statements by TNI and Polri leaders affirming their commitment to civilian supremacy would be an important signal. Huntington (1957) referred to this as objective control, where the professional military maintains a distance from politics so that democracy remains intact.
Thirdly, civil society organizations (CSOs), labor unions, student organizations, and advocacy groups must strengthen channels for honest and open dialogue. Political pressure should be directed towards transparency in investigations, accountability of officials, and policy reform, rather than merely mass mobilization.
CSOs also need to play a watchdog role, documenting human rights violations and proposing policy proposals. The success of past civil society movements, such as the 1998 reforms, demonstrates that consistent pressure can push a country back onto a democratic path.
Fourth, citizens have a crucial role: to maintain peaceful actions, reject provocations, and utilize democratic channels—media, petitions, public forums—to voice their aspirations.
The public must be critical of disinformation that can polarize. Participation in democratic spaces, while perhaps limited, provides social capital to prevent the breakdown of trust.
As Norris (2011) believes, in the Democratic Deficit, active citizen involvement strengthens democratic legitimacy, even when state institutions are shaky.
Ultimately, the crux of this crisis is not just about unequal policies or violence by officers on the streets, but rather a fundamental test of our democracy: whether civil supremacy can prevail or whether we are falling into authoritarian resilience.
Once the military is given the space to reassert control over civilian affairs under the pretext of stability, democracy will lose its meaning. Remember: we must not repeat history where security is used as a justification to seize freedom.
Civil supremacy is the last bastion in ensuring that the state remains aligned with its people, rather than with armed forces. If this bastion collapses, democratic institutions will merely be a framework, devoid of spirit and meaning.
Therefore, maintaining civilian supremacy is not merely a political choice, but a moral and constitutional prerequisite for this nation to remain on the path of democracy.
